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We show that the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner suﬃcient condition for secure cryptographic key generation with
the help of quantum theory can be easily derived using the triangle inequality for an information-
theoretic distance.
Introduction All known proofs of device-independent
cryptographic security are either based on some mani-
festations of quantum incompatibility or monogamy rela-
tions for correlation functions. The ﬁrst approach utilizes
contextuality of quantum correlations [1–3]. The second
one uses the structure of correlations in the so called
generalized probabilistic theories [4–7]. Both approaches
have a common feature, namely, the underlying prob-
abilistic structure. Proofs of these type either assume
limitations to this structure, e.g., non-existence of joint
probability distribution or monogamy of correlations, or
they directly use probability distributions of outcomes of
measurements by Alice, Bob and eavesdropper Eve.
In this short and preliminary note we go beyond the
probabilistic approach. We show that the security of
a cryptographic key generation against individual attacks
can be derived in a surprisingly simple way by assuming
a violation of an information theoretic Bell-type inequal-
ity [10, 11]. The novelty of our approach, apart from its
simplicity, is that we do not assume anything about the
structure of probabilities between Alice, Bob and Eve.
As the security criterion we use the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
theorem (CK) [9]. The theorem states: if the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is greater than the
mutual information between Alice and Eve, i.e., I(A :
B) > I(A : E), then Alice and Bob can extract a secure
cryptographic key. We demonstrate that the premises of
the CK theorem are naturally guaranteed by a violation
of the information theoretic inequality arising from the
triangle inequality [10].
Information distance and the triangle inequality. Let
us ﬁrst recall the idea of an information-theoretic dis-
tance [8, 11]. Consider two real random variables X
and Y and a distance measure between them ∆(X,Y ).
∆(X,Y ) must fulﬁll the following requirements
• non-negativity: ∆(X,Y ) ≥ 0,
• ∆(X,Y ) = 0 iﬀ X = Y ,
• symmetry: ∆(X,Y ) = ∆(Y,X),
• triangle inequality: ∆(X,Y ) + ∆(Y, Z) ≥ ∆(X,Z)
for all X,Y, Z.
An example of such a distance for dichotomic random
variables with outcomes ±1 is the covariance distance
C(X,Y ) = 1− 〈XY 〉, where 〈XY 〉 is a correlation func-
tion deﬁned as 〈XY 〉 =
∑
x,y(−1)
xyp(X = x, Y = y)
with p(X = x, Y = y) being the joint probability distri-
bution. Another example, which we use to derive our re-
sults is a distance based on mutual information I(X : Y )
between the variables X,Y deﬁned as
D(X,Y ) = max{H(X), H(Y )} − I(X : Y ). (1)
H(X) is the Shannon entropy and I(X : Y ) = H(X) +
H(Y )−H(XY ).
It is obvious that the triangle inequality for a prop-
erly deﬁned distance measure must be obeyed. However,
in physical scenarios we encounter random variables that
cannot be jointly measured. Consider three random vari-
ables X,Y, Z such that X can be jointly measured with
Y , Y with Z but Z and X cannot be jointly measured.
Is the triangle inequality obeyed in this case? This ques-
tion is of a counterfactual nature and as such cannot be
directly tested experimentally. In [10], two of us (PK
and DK) postulated that the triangle inequality should
be obeyed even for non-compatible measurements and
we called it the triangle principle. This is deﬁnitely true
in the case of classical correlations; quantum mechanics
violates the triangle principle [10].
Using the triangle principle we can derive a CHSH-like
inequality. Let Alice and Bob perform dichotomic (±1)
measurements A1, A2, B1 and B2. Although in general
A1 and A2 cannot be jointly measured the triangle prin-
ciple implies that
∆(A2, B2) ≤ ∆(A1, B2) + ∆(A1, A2). (2)
It also implies that
∆(A1, A2) ≤ ∆(A1, B1) + ∆(A2, B1). (3)
Combining these two triangle inequalities we obtain a
rectangle inequality
∆(A2, B2) ≤ ∆(A1, B1) + ∆(A2, B1) + ∆(A1, B2). (4)
This inequality can be violated in quantum mechanics. In
particular, if we set ∆(A,B) to be the covariance distance
we get the CHSH inequality. On the other hand, if we
set it to be the distance (1) we get an inequality similar
to the one in [12].
2Main result. Let us now assume the inequality (5) is
violated, i.e.,
∆(A2, B2) > ∆(A1, B1) + ∆(A2, B1) + ∆(A1, B2). (5)
Next, imagine that the system that was measured by Al-
ice and Bob was prepared by Eve who correlated it with
her system. In principle Eve can get some information
about the outcomes of Alice and Bob by performing some
measurement E on her system.
We note that every measurement performed by Eve is
jointly measurable with all measurements performed by
Alice and Bob. In particular, the following is always true
∆(A2, B2) ≤ ∆(A2, E) + ∆(B2, E). (6)
It follows that
∆(A2, E)+∆(B2, E) > ∆(A1, B1)+∆(A2, B1)+∆(A1, B2).
(7)
In addition,
∆(B2, E)−∆(A1, E) ≤ ∆(A1, B2). (8)
We substitute (8) to (7) and obtain
∆(A1, E) + ∆(A2, E) > ∆(A1, B1) + ∆(A2, B1). (9)
For the distance (1) the inequality (9) reads
max{H(A1), H(E)}+max{H(A2), H(E)}
− I(A1 : E)− I(A2 : E) > −I(A1 : B1)− I(A2 : B1)
max{H(A1), H(B1)}+max{H(A2), H(B1)}. (10)
Note that for states that are locally maximally random
H(A1) = H(A2) = H(B1). Therefore, no matter what
the entropy of E is, the following is always true
max{H(A1), H(E)} +max{H(A2), H(E)} ≥
max{H(A1), H(B1)} +max{H(A2), H(B1)}. (11)
Using states with maximally random marginals does not
narrow the generality of the above statement. This is
because of the protocol presented in [13]. This public
coin protocol, which uses 3 bits of shared randomness,
allows to transform an arbitrary distribution of outcomes
of a binary bipartite variable to a variable with uniform
marginals preserving the strength of violations of the
CHSH inequality.
The condition (11) implies:
I(A1 : B1) + I(A2 : B1) > I(A1 : E) + I(A2 : E) (12)
that leads to
1
2
I(A1 : B1) +
1
2
I(A2 : B1) >
1
2
I(A1 : E) +
1
2
I(A2 : E).
(13)
The left-hand side of the above inequality is the mean
mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s raw key
bits
I(KA : KB) =
1
2
I(A1 : B1) +
1
2
I(A2 : B1). (14)
On the other hand, the right-hand side of it is the mean
mutual information between Alice’s raw key bits and
Eve’s bits
I(KA : E) =
1
2
I(A1 : E) +
1
2
I(A2 : E). (15)
This means that a violation of the inequality (9) together
with the assumption of locally random outputs implies
the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner condition
I(KA : KB) > I(KA : E). (16)
Discussion. We showed that a proper choice of an
information-theoretic distance, together with the coun-
terfactual assumption, called the triangle principle and
discussed extensively in [10], leads to an inequality whose
violation guaranties the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner suﬃcient condi-
tion for a secure cryptographic key generation.
An interesting feature of our derivation of the Csisza´r-
Ko¨rner condition is that we do not need to assume any-
thing about the structure of a joint probability distribu-
tion between Alice, Bob and Eve. We only use the ge-
ometric properties of the information-theoretic distance.
We also think that our derivation is incredibly simple and
intuitive. Of course, this is a matter of (subjective) taste.
We would like to point out that the method presented
here seems to be more general than the methods used in
[4–6]. More precisely, the triangle principle is suﬃcient to
derive monogamy relations that are crucial in derivation
in [4–6]. The inverse is not true: the triangle principle
itself is a much more general information theoretic prop-
erty.
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